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ABSTRACT

Following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1838, Costa Rica
and Honduras were highly underdeveloped politically and economically, while at the same time
lacking a strong conservative presence found in the more politically established and
economically developed Central American countries of Guatemala and El Salvador.
However, By the late 20th century Costa Rica established itself as a bastion of democracy in
Latin America, supported by a strong middle class. While on the other hand, Honduras would
fall victim to a continuous string of coup d’états, with the last being in 2009, by a military that
did not exist for the majority of the first half of the 20 th century. Ultimately leading to the
question, what were the conditions that occurred that led to drastic differences in political
development between Costa Rica and Honduras, regardless of similarities following the collapse
of the Federal Republic of Central America?
There is a wide array of literature regarding the topic of Central American political
development with the intent to answer this question, however it falls short when analyzing the
case of Honduras. Now that, its political history is not as violent as that of El Salvador and
Guatemala, it did not have the large-scale socialist presence of Nicaragua and did not become the
democratic success of Costa Rica. Ultimately, leading to the under theorization of Honduran
political development.
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Due to this, this work provides a theory guided application of a path dependent
explanation to understand the political development of both Costa Rica and Honduras, and the
distinction between the two, regardless of their similarities at one point in time. Making the case
that distinctions between the distribution of de jure property rights during processes of
establishing legitimacy is ultimately able to explain the emergence of the particular interest
groups in both countries, that define their respective political development.
With the application of this theory guided approach to a path dependent explanation, it is
possible to make the case that during their respective periods of establishing legitimacy, Costa
Rica developed a strong middle class with the desire to participate in the political process,
leading to the rise of the strong democratic institutions it now has; while in the case of Honduras
a political class dependent on foreign military and financial aid and a national military keen on
intervening in domestic politics, creating institutions whose stability is dependent on the interests
of the military, political class, and United States state and non-state actors.
Ultimately, this work not only helps to overcome the under theorization of Honduran
political development and contribute to research on Central American political economy, but
provide a theory broad enough to apply to other cases involving political development from a
property rights perspective.
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INTRODUCTION

Following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1838, both
Honduras and Costa Rica faced a highly undeveloped political and economic landscape, in
comparison to other countries that made up the Federal Republic, such as El Salvador and
Guatemala. In addition to this, both Costa Rican and Honduran history is much less violent than
their Central American counterparts, partly due to the fact that they were highly undeveloped in
1838, but also due to the lack of a strong conservative presence within these two countries.
However, by the mid-20th century, there were drastic differences in the both the political
and economic development of the two. Costa Rica developed a local economy revolving around
the production of coffee and even though a merchant/export class existed within the country, a
small landholding middle class emerged, ultimately forcing political development to include
these individuals in the political process. This middle class influenced the diversification of
political ideology within the country and influence the fact that Costa Rica would eventually
become the longest standing democracy in region, with respect towards political freedoms and
civil liberties.
On the other hand, Honduras did not develop a local economy that allowed for the
emergence of a middle class that would influence the political development of the country.
Instead the country developed a local economy driven by banana exports and owned by United
States capitalists to which the local political class were dependent on, and a military class
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influential in Honduran politics that did not exist prior to the second quarter of the 20 th century.
The influence of foreign interests, a political class dependent on these interests, and the existence
of a military class would ultimately play an effect on the string of coup d’états in the second half
of the 20th century and into the 21st century, as well as a flawed democratic system lacking
respect towards political freedoms and civil liberties.
Latin Americanists have aimed to not only explain the political development of Costa
Rica and Honduras, but Central America as a whole. Unfortunately, in the process leading to a
significant level of under theorizing when it comes to Honduras and unable to explain Honduran
political development. To avoid the under theorization of Honduras, this thesis aims to develop a
theory properly able to grasp Honduran political development and in the process answering the
question why is Honduran and Costa Rican political development significantly different,
regardless of their similarities following independence from Spain in 1821 and the
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1838?
Due to this, it is necessary to develop a theory broad enough to fit both Honduras and
Costa Rica and at the same time allowing for mid-level theorizing, in order to do so, it is
necessary to adopt an ahistorical theory, properly able to grasp the dynamic nature of
development. As a consequence of the aforementioned, this project aims to employ and develop
political economic theory, in order to guide the study of political development of both Honduras
and Costa Rica.
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODS, METHODOLOGY, AND
HYPOTHESIS

AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS (THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK)
The word “wirtschaftende” in German means to economize and the causalrealist/Austrian tradition of economics inspired by Carl Menger places Wirtschaftender
Individuum or the economizing man at the center of any analysis. Menger and the tradition he
inspired, aims to analyze the “practical activities of economizing individuals” (Principles of
Economics 2007, 48). Deducing economic action from the axiomatic principle that all
individuals act purposively and apply means to attain ends amidst scarcity (Mises, Human
Action: A Treatise on Economics 1998, 70). The causal-realist tradition does not aim to study
how individuals maximize or will maximize utility from unrealistic models, but instead looks at
purposeful human behavior and the results of said action(s); placing a significant amount of
importance on the concepts of time, ordinal maximand, and the relation between the application
of methodological individualism and institutions.
Austrians differentiate themselves from their neoclassical counterparts in the field of
economics, due to the importance placed on the concept of time. The latter depicting the world
and economics through static equilibrium models with unrealistic assumptions surrounding
human action, while the former understanding that humans do not hold perfect knowledge and
err, while simultaneously making decisions in time. As stated by Menger regarding the study of
3

economics (2007), “a process of change involves a beginning and a becoming, and these are only
conceivable as processes in time… it is certain that we can never fully understand the causal
interconnections of the various occurrences in a process, or the process itself, unless we view it
in time and apply the measure of time to it (67).” Although, time is central to the causal-realist
study of economics, this does not absolve or imply that certain occurrences and economic
phenomena of a particular point in time and region are not bound or explainable by economic
laws deduced from the axiomatic principle of purposive individual action and the application of
means to attain ends amidst scarcity. The Austrian approach to economics is ultimately
ahistorical, however the importance placed on time allows for the introduction of an antihistorical method based around cause and effect with the ability to realistically observe economic
phenomena empirically, without unrealistic assumptions, hence the term causal-realist. The word
causal stemming from the importance of understanding cause and effect and realist as in
adhering to realistic assumptions surrounding human behavior, evident in the distinctions
between the neoclassical and Austrian application of utility.
Even though, both the neoclassical and Austrian study of economics involve the
application of utility, through the use of the maximand, and the understanding that individuals
aim to maximize utility, there are distinctions in their interpretation and representation. During
the marginal revolution of the 1870s, where Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Léon
Walras independently developed the concept of marginal utility, Jevons and Walras ignored the
central role of cause and effect, favoring “the technique of modeling complex relations as a
systems of simultaneous equations in which no variable ‘causes’ another” (Klein 2007, 7). The
non-Austrian concept of utility is the mathematical interpretation dominant in mainstream or
neoclassical microeconomics, placing homoeconomicus in a vacuum separated from time, with
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the sole purpose of maximizing revenue and profit, ignoring the fact that in reality value is
immeasurable and distinctive to each individual. The Austrian adopts radical subjectivism and, in
the process, depicting utility as an ordinal phenomenon where to maximize utility decisions
making is dependent on the level of importance of different ends an individual ascribes to it.
Additionally, unlike the atomistic neoclassical approach to the individual and its
application of methodological individualism to the study of economics, the causal-realist
tradition does not ignore the social relation amongst individuals; but instead, applies economic
methods to understanding how these institutions arise and function. Products of the distinct ends
and means employed by individuals, lead to the rise and development of social dynamics.
Notwithstanding the importance of institutions to the causal-realist tradition, it does not take a
holistic approach to the study of economics, but instead understands that the only way to
properly study economics is to acknowledge that groups and collective action do not occur
separate from the individuals that compose said groups (Rothbard, Man Economy, and State with
Power and Market 2009, 2-3). And the only way to meaningfully interpret human action is
through the application of methodological individualism and the understanding that laws of
economics bind individual behavior.
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INSTITUTIONS (THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK)
Ultimately, the causal-realist acknowledgement of time to the study of economics allows
for an institutionalist and evolutionary approach to the study of economic phenomena and
finding a space within the field of economics for this approach, for individuals interested in
applying economic tools and methods to the study of historic phenomena. However, the purpose
of this thesis as a whole is applying the Austrian ahistorical theory to the study of political
development. Due to the political nature of it, it is necessary to identify a space within political
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science that allows for the introduction of a Mengerian approach to the study of political
phenomena and institutions.
Within political science there are three distinct analytical approaches to the study of institutions:
the sociological, rational choice, and historical approaches. The methodological implications of
the sociological and rational choice institutionalists deem both as incompatible to any Mengerian
approach to institutions. However, the hybridization of rational choice and sociological
institutionalism found in historical institutionalism allows for the possibility of a study of
political economy consistent with the importance of time, maximand, and application of
methodological individualism to the interpretation of institutions made by Austrians.
By analyzing the implications of sociological institutionalism, it is possible to recognize the
incompatibility between sociological institutionalism and causal-realism, due to both the
interpretation of utility and the application of methodological individualism. Now that the
sociological institutionalist is not concerned with how an individual maximizes utility, by the
application of means in the attainment of ends, but instead concerned as to why individuals and
organizations embrace a set of institutions or actions due to their value within a cultural context
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 949). The sociological approach aims to answer a set of questions that
causal-realists are not concerned with, and its holistic approach is inconsistent with
methodological individualism, now that the questions raised by sociological institutionalists are
primarily concerned with how culture affects the individual and organizations and not the other
way around.
On the other hand, the rational choice institutionalist, take on what James Alt and
Kenneth Shepsle identify as the calculus approach to institutionalism (1998, 735), viewing
institutions as outcomes of Nash equilibriums (Furubotn and Richter 1997, 39). Due to this, the
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rational choice approach shares the static nature of neoclassical models in economics and in the
process strip any cultural implications away from an analysis, limiting individual behavior and
the creation of institutions to the extent as which it minimizes transaction costs and maximizes
utility (946). Deeming the rational choice institutionalism as inconsistent with causal-realism
now that causal realists aim “to understand/elucidate purposive behavior in the context of the
actor’s intent and to bring into relief the unintended consequences of human action” (Boettke and
Leeson, An ‘Austrian’ Perspective on Public Choice 2004, 28). Without an understanding of the
context individuals face it is not possible to meaningfully interpret human action, interpreting
institutions, not as efficient with the purpose of minimizing transaction costs and maximizing
utility, but efficient to the ends of a society, where culture and norms potentially play a role or
influence in the decision making process.
Historical institutionalists differ from both sociological and rational choice
institutionalists by certain distinctive features consistent with causal-realism: the broad
conceptualization of the relationship between institutions and individual, asymmetries of power
during the process of institutional development, and the importance of path dependent
explanations and unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). By conceptualizing the
relationship between institutions and individual in broad terms, research from a historical
institutionalist approach potentially adheres to a rational choice, sociological, or a combination
of the two approaches. The combination of the two is consistent with an Austrian interpretation
of the relationship between institution and individual, finding themselves in a point in-between
what Boettke (1989) identifies as naïve individualism and holism within economics, as
sophisticated individualists (76). The naïve individualist takes on an atomistic and strictly
calculative view of the individual, the holist takes social institutions as a given without
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acknowledging their emergence as a product of and traceable back to the result of distinct
individual ends, while the sophisticated individualist, places the individual as central to its
analysis and by doing so “able to understand and thus explain the origin and evolution of
institutions, such as the market, law, and rules of conduct” (Boettke, 77).
There are additional similarities between Austrians and historical institutionalists,
particularly regarding asymmetries of power during the process of institutional development.
Within the causal-realist tradition, Murray Rothbard’s analysis of unions in Man, Economy, and
State notes how unions achieve higher wages for members of their organization at the expense of
lowering wage rates of those excluded from this institution (708). In Power and Market,
Rothbard identifies how government intervention within the political economy leads to the rise
of special interest groups and ultimately class conflict, a similar observation is made by Hayek
(2009) in his analysis of inflationary monetary policy and how certain groups benefit from these
policies, with short term higher purchasing power, at the expense of others in the long run.
Central to analyses by both Austrians and historical institutionalists is the conceptualization of
cause and effect, as an evolutionary process: observable in the historical institutionalists’ use of
path dependence as a tool to their analyses, and the role of time in the study of economics by
Austrians. Due to the importance of cause and effect by both, the use of the two in conjunction
potentially expands the breadth of analyses involving the study of political economy. Historical
institutionalists with a systematic guide to studying the evolution of institutions within a
historical context and causal-realists with an ahistorical economic method and theory able to
guide the interpretation of these historical events.
In conclusion, regardless of the incompatibility of rational choice and sociological
institutionalism with causal-realism, historical institutionalism is not only compatible with the
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Mengerian approach, but the two in conjunction are able to expand the analytical breadth of
analyses involving the field of political economy. This is primarily due to the similarities
between the hybridization of rational choice and sociological institutionalism found in historical
institutionalism and the sophisticated individualism of causal-realists found in an in-between of
naïve individualism and holism. Additionally, due to the use of path-dependence by historical
institutionalists and time within the study of economic phenomena by Austrians, it is possible to
create a theory guided explanation and application of path dependence of political economic
phenomena within their respective historical contexts (which will be developed in Chapter 2).
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PATH DEPENDENCE (METHOD
AND METHODOLOGY)

The basis of the economic theory of political development derives from the axiomatic
principle that individuals act purposively, by applying means in the attainment of ends amidst
scarcity. Austrians take this to be true, deducing economic theory through the use of this
axiomatic principle. However, it is important to note that this does not imply that these
deductions are able to explain the ends of individuals within a certain point in time. This calls for
the necessity of the use of empirical or historical data, with these economic laws guiding the
analysis alongside the process. Although Chapter 2 of this thesis will elaborate the theory in
depth, a brief summary of its assumptions is necessary and then point out how the study of
history through the application of path dependent explanations is able to supplement these
theoretical developments.
First, the state is a predatory entity as it does not emerge through a unanimity rule and if
it emerges through some form of social contract, it excludes individuals from the contracting,
due to its monopoly on the use of force will eventually abandon the contract, and predate all
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individuals in society. Although, the state holds a monopoly on the use of force, its level of
predation is limited to the extent an individual holds the means to fend themselves against
predation, this leads to a drawing of de jure property rights between state and individual.
Although limited, the ability for an individual to save and invest within the initial
drawing of property rights, allow for an increment in wealth and the ability to acquire means to
fight predation or purchase additional property rights. This is a dynamic process in which
individuals and the state are constantly able to negotiate property rights, leading to the rise of
eventual freedoms associated with the process of political development; now that property rights
are the extent to which one individual accepts another individual’s self-ownership and extensions
of self-ownerships in property and the fruits of one’s labor. In addition to this, it is able to
explain the rise of interest groups, due to greater means to fight efforts of predation by the state
or the ability to buy additional property rights from the state; and instability in democratic
institutions that do not emerge through an increase in means, if a state desires to maintain the
same level of predation, now that it will increase its predation on individuals with the means to
challenge that level of predation, eventually leading to the removal of these democratic
institutions (all theoretical insight is further elaborated in the theory chapter).
In the application of this theory, it is necessary to adopt a method able to examine the
dynamics that occur within it, ultimately it is an evolutionary theory of both the state and society.
The path dependent explanation allows for a systemization of this theory in order to guide its
application to the study of political development, when applying it to the historical contexts of
both Honduras and Costa Rica.
The importance of path dependence lies in the understanding that specific events and
phenomena are the product of a sequential pattern (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2017, 48-49).
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These patterns exist within time, since the theory to be further developed in Chapter 2, lies in
understanding the process of development, it is necessary to understand the sequence of patterns
in which these two occur, in Costa Rica and Honduras. Where the theory develops how they
occur, the study of both Costa Rica and Honduras, not only tests the validity of the theory, but
also tests how these events came to occur within these two countries, through the production and
reproduction of sequences to these occurrences(49). It is difficult to diverge from these paths
and the abandonment of these institutions due to the transaction costs involved with divergence
and costs of institution reconstruction. However, before studying any path dependent process it is
necessary to understand the crucial event leading to the emergence of the development of a set of
institutions and the sequences that reinforced said event, these institutions are born in a period of
critical juncture (50).
A critical juncture must occur in order to lead to the rise of a particular path and rise of
institutions that within the process evolve and reinforce themselves within society, and due to
costs surrounding institutions difficult to abandon. In systemizing a path dependent approach the
process develops in the following matter. The first involves the antecedent conditions, or in other
words the “historical factors that define available options and shape selection processes (Donelly
2010, 44-45).” The second is the critical juncture or moment in time where the selection of a set
of options led to the rise of a set of institutions. The third, structural persistence, during this time
there is a reproduction of sequences strengthening the set of institutions that arise during this
time. Fourth, reactive sequence, consisting reactions and counter reactions to this set of events.
The fifth, outcome, or the effect to the resolution of actions or counter reactions.
Placing the theory within this systemized process path dependence it is then possible to
see the chain of events involving this theory of political and economic development. When
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looking into the antecedent conditions of a critical juncture, it is necessary to understand the
means available to groups within a historical context to either predate or challenge predation.
The critical juncture, is the point in time where the individuals with the means to predate and the
end of establishing a state, set forward a process of state centralization or legitimization, this
leads to the initial drawing of de jure property rights. Due to the discriminatory nature of this
process, the increase in means to challenge predation is different dependent on the individual,
this leads to the rise of special interest groups within a certain society, and policy constrained by
these special interest groups and the state’s predation ability. The reaction to this rise of special
interest groups, then leads to a process of democratization, with the outcome being either the
success or failure of the establishment of these democratic institutions.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA (EXISTING LITERATURE/LITERATURE
REVIEW)
An issue with existing literature surrounding the process of political development within
Central America is the lack of clarity surrounding what political development is, however this is
a problem not only with the existing literature on Central America, but literature involving
political development as a whole. Within the existing literature surrounding Central American
research involving political development, characterizing political development as a process of
power centralization, the ability of states to pursue their ends, and in the process leading to the
democratization of the region. However, a unique feature of this thesis is the defining of political
development as a process in which political freedoms arise; viewing political freedom within a
negative liberty lens, such as freedom of speech and religion, without ignoring the fact that these
political freedoms characterize democratic processes and institutions.
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Regardless, of the lack of the clear defining of political development, there is a wide
array of path dependent explanations to Central American political development, viewing
political development as a process in which the state centralizes power and in the process
increasing its ability to enforce policy/laws. However, an issue with the existing literature is that
there is very little work involving Honduras’s political development; now that its institutions
were less violent than regimes found in both Guatemala and El Salvador, not a success story of
democracy, such as in Costa Rica and the complete absence of socialist governments and
movements in Nicaragua. Due to this, although Honduras is included within the literature, the
differing path dependent explanations are not properly able to explain the political development
of Honduras.
James Mahoney (2001), properly critiques the differing path dependent explanations and
their identification of periods of critical junctures, such the colonial period, depression period,
post-World War II period, and the liberal reform period as a critical juncture; and ultimately
makes the claim of the period of liberal reform as a critical juncture for all Central American
countries falls short, regarding Honduras. Due to this, it is necessary to both adopt and expand
Mahoney’s critiques and then demonstrate why the period of liberal reform is not a critical
juncture for Honduras.
In Government and Society in Central America, 1680-1840, Miles Wortman (1982)
focuses on tracing development throughout colonial Central America and is a significant
contribution to the study of colonial Central American political economy. However, regardless of
its contribution to the understanding of institutions of this time with their potential residual effect
on the political economy of present, it is insufficient to explain/include structures of postindependence. In the case of Honduras, the colonial period is insufficient in explaining the rise of
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the conservative political party of the Partido Nacional, which militarized and centralized state
power within the country, but not existing until the early 20 th century; while in the case of Costa
Rica it cannot explain the rise of a strong middle class demanding democracy in the region.
In addition to this Mahoney (2001), points out that differences during the colonial period
of this time are not sufficiently large enough to properly explain the path divergence of El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica; and even though the colonial footprint lessened
the farther south, Guatemala with the strongest colonial impact and Costa Rica with the weakest
colonial impact, this explanation might only be applicable in explaining path divergence in both
Guatemala and Costa Rica.
Enrique A. Baloyra-Herp (2009), establishes his period of critical juncture during the
Great Depression, characterizing this period as one defined by the rise of reactionary despotism
and despots. Central to his theory is the claim that in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El
Salvador, during the period of the Great Depression, rural elites aiming to maintain hegemony
over workers’ upheaval, allied themselves with despots with military power, leading to
dictatorships in the region; and due to this, how the state interacted with these despots defined
the political development of the region. However, as pointed out by Mahoney (2001), worker
movements within Honduras were not against national elite, but instead foreign owned banana
companies (26). In addition to this, it is necessary to point out that the Honduran government
was extremely decentralized during the initial period of the Great Depression and a national
military did not exist until the Tiburcio Carias dictatorship in the latter half of this period and the
Carias dictatorship was significantly less violent than the dictatorships found in Guatemala and
El Salvador.
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In Demanding Democracy, Deborah Yashar (1997) makes the claim that the post WWII
period was a critical juncture, however her work only focuses on Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Applying her claim to Honduras it does not include the process into which major players in the
political development of Honduras arose, such as the military, the Partido Nacional, and United
States special interests. Ultimately forcing any critical juncture involving political development
of Honduras to a period prior to this.
Finally, James Mahoney (2001), places the period of liberal reform as the critical juncture
within all Central American countries. With a reformist liberalization in Costa Rica, a radical
liberalization in El Salvador and Guatemala, and aborted liberalism or failed liberalization in
Honduras and Nicaragua. A feature of the countries where liberal reform succeeded, such as in
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala is a process of power centralization. A process that did
not occur in Honduras and Nicaragua, due to the introduction of the United States as highly
influential within the political structures of these countries.
However, regardless of the lack of power centralization in Honduras during the period of
liberal reform, it eventually occurred during the Tiburcio Carias dictatorship in the first half of
the 20th century. Defining this period as a critical juncture in Honduran politics. Where the
period of liberal reform might have served as a critical juncture and period of state power
centralization in Costa Rica, the period of power centralization in Honduras occurred during the
Carias presidency. Making the case that for a comparative analysis of both Costa Rica and
Honduras the Carias dictatorship must be included in an analysis. Particularly, regarding the
purpose of this thesis and a path dependent explanation to development of both of these
countries.
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HYPOTHESIS
It is possible to make the case that there are three separate parts to the hypothesis within
this thesis. The first is a theoretical, making the case that property right distribution during the
process of establishing legitimacy or centralizing power is able to explain the political
development of a region or nation. The importance placed on the centralization of power or
establishing legitimacy, is due to the fact that both require the state to be able to hold enough
power to either establish its monopoly over a geographical region or increase the extent of its
monopoly over said region.
The second part to this hypothesis is that the period of liberal reform in Costa Rica,
served as a period of both establishing legitimacy and centralizing power increasing its ability to
enforce laws in the country and having a long term effect on the political development of the
country, ultimately making the period of liberal reform a critical juncture in Costa Rican history.
This claim is similar to that of James Mahoney (2001). However, an issue with Mahoney’s work
as a whole is that he defines the period of liberal reform in Costa Rica as one of almost 100
years, from 1821-1914. He divides the liberal reform in two phases one from 1821-1870 and the
other from 1870-1914; the first phase is one of establishing legitimacy and the second is one of
government expansion.
Due to the large span of time Mahoney designates as a period of critical juncture, Chapter
3 will make the case that the critical juncture is the period of time between 1838-1871, beginning
with the dissolution of the Central American Federal Republic and the emergence of the 1871
constitution. This is primarily due to the fact that for the first time in history Costa Rica emerges
as a sovereign state and forcing state actors to take on the task of establishing legitimacy; this
period ends in 1871 because there is the emergence of a Costa Rican constitution that is largely
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maintained until 1949 and within it there are guarantees involving property that the state was not
able to enforce prior to this.
The second part to this hypothesis is that the Tiburcio Carias dictatorship served as a
critical juncture able to explain the political development and rise of interest groups within the
country. In agreeance with Mahoney, the chapter on Honduras will demonstrate how during the
period of liberal reform state actors were unable to establish legitimacy within the country.
However, unlike Mahoney whom disregards the Carías dictatorship as a period of establishing
legitimacy, the chapter on Honduras makes the case that Carías centralized power and
established legitimacy, ultimately giving explanatory power to the rise of special interests such
as the Honduran military, United States government, and the Partido Nacional.
Mahoney is critical of other scholars trying to shove the case of Honduran political
development into a theoretical box that does not fit. However, by disregarding the Carías
dictatorship and its impact on establishing legitimacy, Mahoney finds himself making the same
mistake as other scholars. The chapter on Honduras makes the case that the span of time 19241949 served as a critical juncture within Honduran politics able to explain the political
development of the nation; now that in 1924-1931, Carías served as president of congress and his
dictatorship spanned from 1933-1949.
Ultimately making the overarching hypothesis that the distribution of property rights
during periods of establishing legitimacy or centralizing power are able to explain the political
development of a nation. In Costa Rica this happened during the period of liberal reform during
the span of time of 1838-1871, in which Costa Rica develops a middle class able to constrain
state predation, and leading to the gradual emergence of political freedoms and democratization
within the country. While in Honduras, the state’s ability to enforce laws and centralize power
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did not happen until Carías’s involvement in politics, leading to a state constrained by special
political interests both foreign and domestic, explaining the failure of the emergence of a stable
democracy within the country and political freedoms and civil liberties.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has laid out the theoretical and methodological arguments, necessary for the
remaining chapters within the text. The following chapter, Chapter 2, will develop a property
rights theory of political development, highly influenced by Austrian insight; as briefly
developed in the method and methodology section of this chapter, the aim of the theory is to
demonstrate the relationship between power and property rights when a state aims to establish
legitimacy and the effect this has on political development. Chapter 3, will then apply a path
dependent explanation to Costa Rica, while Chapter 4, will focus on Honduras. Finally, Chapter
5 will serve as the integration of the path dependent explanations of the two countries within the
theoretical context.

18

CHAPTER 2: A PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to develop and establish an economic theory of political development,
demonstrating that the freedoms associated with the process of political development and the
establishment of democratic institutions and values, are ultimately a product of a constant
redrawing of property rights between state and individual. This process is only possible through
a certain level of economic development, making it a necessary condition to political
development.
To best develop this theory the organization of this chapter is one consisting of six parts.
Through the use of the thought experiment of the isolated individual, the first part will look into
the requirements of economic growth and development, demonstrating the importance of savings
and the proper investment and allocation of capital. Even though it is possible to demonstrate
economic growth and development through the use of the thought experiment of the isolated
individual, the second part will then point out that all interpersonal exchange, either voluntary or
violent, is dependent on an individual’s acknowledgment of another’s self-ownership. This
acknowledgment of self-ownership or the process of establishing property rights, ultimately have
an effect and can constrain a society’s economic development and growth.
Although this chapter will demonstrate how property rights initially emerge through de
facto norms and not de jure laws, due to political development being a phenomena requiring the
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state, the third part will introduce dominant theories within economics involving the emergence
of the state and the state in of itself. However, due to the underlying claim of these theories that
the state is a beneficial entity, coming to existence unanimously through the social contract, and
better than anarchy, regardless of any predatory features it might have, it is inapplicable to
historic situations of plunder and imposition, and challenged by cases where individuals are
better off without a state.
In order to overcome the issues and inapplicability of a contractarian theory of the state,
the fifth part introduces a predatory theory of the state, while the sixth demonstrates the necessity
of introducing the concept of power over the individual as a means within any analysis involving
the state, now that it must first hold sufficient power to impose itself on any individual, in order
to establish hegemony and legitimacy. With the understanding that all interpersonal exchange
requires an acknowledgement of one individual’s property rights of the other, this theory will
make the case that a state’s predation is limited to the extent of its power over an individual and
individual’s ability to challenge the state’s predation; demonstrating the initial drawing of
property rights through de jure laws.
With the understanding that the state uses power as a means to establish legitimacy; an
individual’s property rights depend on its ability to challenge the state’s predation; savings,
investment and the proper allocation of capital are necessary for economic development; and
economic development is dependent on societal acknowledgment of an individual’s selfownership, an economic theory of political development is possible. Now that, even though an
individual’s ability to save and invest is limited to the initial drawings of property rights by the
state, any increase in welfare allows for the ability to either invest in the means to fight against
predation or “purchase” property rights from the state. Ultimately, leading to a continuous
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redrawing of property rights and the introduction the political freedoms that characterize political
development.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
To avoid confusion, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between both economic
development and economic growth. Economic development is the process in which there
are qualitative improvements in standards of living, where individuals are also able to pursue
ends beyond those necessary for basic subsistence. This differentiates from the concept of
economic growth or as defined by Ludwig Lachman (1978), economic progress, requiring of
constant restructuring and expansion of the capital structure and only possible through the
process of sacrificing current consumption for future consumption i.e. savings and (non-mal)
investment.
The processes of economic growth and development are visible in the use of the isolated
individual stranded on an island, better known as Crusoe economics. At the current point of time
in this scenario, Crusoe currently fishes with their hands and is only capable of catching one fish
per hour and in order to not be hungry throughout the day must eat at a minimum five fish.
Unsatisfied with current output, Crusoe decides to build a spear, but in order to do so must
sacrifice two hours of time. During these two hours, Crusoe must find a piece of wood that is
not too long or too short, now that if it is too long it will wobble when thrown and if too short
challenging to throw properly. In addition to this, Crusoe must also find a stone that is not too
dull where it cannot pierce through a fish or too sharp that it will cut through the string made
from tree bark tying the wood and stone together. After allocating two hours of time in finding
the materials needed and building the spear, Crusoe returns to the fishing grounds and is able to
catch five fish in one hour. Increasing the hourly output of fish, while now able to allocate time
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to an end not possible without the existence of a spear, in this case allocating the remaining two
hours to exploration.
What this thought experiment demonstrates is that economic growth requires a
restructuring and expansion of the existing capital structure. Economists have long observed that
the driver of economic growth lies in the concept and importance of capital, observable in
classical development economics literature. Walt Whitman Rostow identifies the process of
capital accumulation in his preconditions for take-off stage whilst addressing his five stages of
economic growth in his dynamic model of economic growth (The Stages of Economic Growth
1959, 4-5). While independent work by both Roy F. Harrod and Evsey Domar focused on
stability properties within a Keynesian macroeconomic framework, their individual works led to
the first generally accepted economic growth model within economics (Ritenour 2016, 2-3).
Similar to Rostow’s take off stage, the Harrod-Domar Growth Model identified the importance
and effect of capital accumulation on economic growth (Todaro and Smith 2017, 120).
Replacing the Harrod-Domar growth model within development economics, the Solow growth
model maintains the assumptions made by both Harrod and Domar involving the importance of
capital, whilst introducing labor as a factor and technology as an independent variable within the
model (1956, 65-66).
Within the Austrian tradition, although Carl Menger himself never used the term, he was
the first to identify and analyze the “Capital Structure” (Shenoy 2010, 48), placing importance on
the concept of capital and its effect on economic growth. However, differing from literature and
models in classical development economics on capital, any Austrian analysis involving economic
growth not only involves capital accumulation, but its proper investment. Visible in Crusoe’s
need to build a spear with particular specifications, in order to increase output.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS
Although the thought experiment of the isolated individual is useful to demonstrate the
basic requirements of savings and proper investment needed for economic growth. In order to
introduce a theory of the state or a theory of political development it is necessary to expand the
analysis by expanding the thought experiment to include more than one individual. In this case
the introduction of a second individual named “Friday”.
During the two hours allocated to exploration Crusoe bumps into Friday. Similar to
Crusoe, Friday just went through a process of saving and investment building a fruit picker that
now allow the ability to pull 10 fruits per hour from the tree, where before 5 hours were required
to climb up in the tree and pick the same amount. Crusoe sees the fruit and fruit picker Friday
has and finds them both appealing. Ultimately, Crusoe faces a decision of offering the fish or
spear in exchange for some fruit, the fruit picker, or they can steal them.
Austrians identify two forms of interpersonal action, the voluntary or the violent (Mises,
A Treatise on Economics: Human Action 2008, 196-197, Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State
with Power and Market 2009, 84-85). If Crusoe offers an exchange and Friday accepts, this is a
voluntary interaction and now both individuals are better off. However, if Crusoe decides to steal
from Friday, this is a violent interaction and one benefits at the expense of the other. Ultimately,
the decision Crusoe makes depends on the extent of the acknowledgement of Friday’s ownership
of the fruit, fruit picker, and ultimately, themselves. If Crusoe decides to kill Friday and steal the
fruit and the fruit picker, then there is no acknowledgement of any form of ownership, if Crusoe
decides that the only way to receive either fruit or the fruit picker is through trade then there is
full acknowledgement of ownership. Ultimately, although its true development is much more
complex, what this demonstrates is the emergence of property rights. Either a full
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acknowledgement of an individual’s self-ownership, including the fruits of their labor, no
acknowledgement, or an in between.
Property and property rights are an unintended historical development, developing and
evolving through time. In other words, not a product of central planning, but instead first coming
into existence through rules and conventions, an evolutionary process, and a result of distinct
individual ends (Shenoy 2010). A society, might not purposefully decide to enact rules
surrounding property, but instead property rights emerge as a byproduct of the historical
development of norms surrounding property; Robert Sugden (1989), identifies this as de facto
property rights (95-96). Due to its normative nature de facto property rights are self-enforcing,
without the need of the state, where the costs of nonobservance are greater than any benefit
gained from not adhering to these norms (Pejovich 1990, 27).
This is not to say that property rights are strictly normative in nature, now that in analyses
that include the state, de jure laws do play an important role in the interaction between the state
and property. However, for purpose of this theory it is important to note that property and
property rights can and do exist in a state of anarchy; and first and foremost a social and
normative institution, rather than one only possible through the enactment of legislation.
Although, economists are known to challenge the longevity of these institutions, particularly in
relation to development (Bush and Mayer 1974).
This social interaction of acknowledging property rights, alongside a sound monetary
system, allows individuals within a society to base their valuations of goods against one another
and understand the potential profitability of allocating capital within a structure, what Mises
defines as economic calculation (Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth 1990). In
addition to this, how property and property rights are distributed and established affects “the
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allocation of resources and the flow of innovation in specific and predictable ways (Pejovich
1990, 30).” In other words, economic calculation is dependent on the constraints and freedom
involving the movement of capital in relation to a society’s conception of property and property
rights. These constraints involving the vertical movement of capital, having an effect on the
potential expansion of capital structures (economic growth) and ultimately economic
development. It is of crucial importance to understand the role of property rights in economic
development, now that without economic calculation, there is no movement of capital and
economic calculation is only possible through the existence of private property. In other words
without private property there is no economic development and even though it is impossible to
completely abolish private property, either societal or state imposed constraints on property limit
a region’s potential for economic development (Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist
Commonwealth 1990).
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE STATE
As previously noted, although briefly, the state does interact with property rights; and
even though property and property rights emerge as normative bound institutions, the state
interacts with property rights through the enactment and enforcement of de jure laws. The
interaction between state and property, then holds the potential to also mold and change the rules
surrounding property. Ultimately, playing a major role in any study of economic development,
now that the state is able to have an effect on the movement of a society’s capital. However,
prior to any analysis involving the state it is necessary to define the nature, purpose and
dynamics of the state.
Public choice theorists, establish an economic theory of the state and developed in detail
in works such as Buchanan’s The Limits of Liberty, making the case for a contractarian theory of
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the state within economic analyses. Buchanan begins his analysis using Crusoe economics or the
isolate individual thought experiment, and identifying this pre-state scenario as the Hobbesian
state of anarchy.
However, within Buchanan’s analysis he adopts a pessimist view of human action. Using
Crusoe and Friday as an example, within this scenario there is no acknowledgement of either’s
self-ownership and instead they both decide to steal from each other. This violent interaction
between the two continues and in order to avoid future assaults both must reallocate time to
defend themselves, time that could have been used fishing, picking fruit, improving or
maintaining the spear and improving or maintaining the fruit picker. Bush and Mayer (1974)
identify this scenario as the non-cooperative game in the Hobbesian jungle (405).
In this state of anarchy, Crusoe and Friday are constantly partaking in both predatory
behavior and defending themselves from predatory behavior, in addition to basic production.
Eventually, both reach a point to where they are able to both calculate and be aware of the
resources needed to produce, defend themselves, and partake in predatory behavior, the natural
equilibrium in the Hobbesian jungle (405-407). Friday and Crusoe identify the losses created by
partaking in predatory behavior, understanding that it is better to respect and acknowledge each
other’s property and reallocate the resources wasted on predatory behavior to more productive
endeavors (407).
Friday and Crusoe transition themselves from the Hobbesian jungle to a state of orderly
anarchy (407); a process of disarmament and establishment of property rights (Buchanan, 588).
Both, Friday and Crusoe, decide to no longer partake in predatory behavior and establish an
initial contract setting boundaries involving property and private goods. However, as noted by
Bush and Mayer, even though there is no longer a non-cooperative game, the game set in place
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still posits a prisoner’s dilemma. If an individual decides to break the established contract, they
benefit at the expense of any other party within the contract, eventually incentivizing other
individuals to break contract and transition from orderly anarchy back to the Hobbesian jungle
(1974, 410).
To overcome this issue, Buchanan identifies that all parties consent to the initial contract
of establishing property rights, there is a unanimity rule. Furthermore, in understanding that there
are incentives other parties face in breaking contract, there is a consensus that it is necessary to
call in an arbitrator or third party to enforce this contract. According to Buchanan, individuals
understand that they are better off with a third-party enforcer i.e. the state, granting it legitimacy
due to consent surrounding the social/initial contract (1975, 66).
Douglas North (1986) makes similar observations in his neoclassical theory of the state,
making the case that there are initial gains from the creation of the state. However, introducing
predatory features into the dynamics of the state and by doing so identifying that the state is in a
state of conflict between maximizing societal output and attempting to maximize state revenue.
This conflict leads to the enactment or establishment of inefficient property rights, ultimately
leading to some form of harm to particular individuals within society. Notwithstanding, even
though North identifies the negative effect de jure laws have on property rights (249-250), he
still maintains a similar argument to that of Buchanan, claiming that individuals are still better
off with inefficient property rights over a state than of anarchy.
However, there is a major issue with the representation the establishment of the state as
one where all parties gain from it and there is some level of unanimity or consent, and
simultaneously disregarding the viability of anarchy in the process. When applying these claims
historically, regarding colonialism, it is possible to make the case in favor of instances where the
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state emerges through some form of unanimity, this is the case with colonization through
settlement. Cases, where the colonists were (usually) non state-actors and a primary end involved
settling in a new geographical region (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 1370).
Nonetheless, inapplicable in the case of extractive colonization; instances, where a primary end
of the colonist is to extract as much from a geographical area as possible (1370). Unlike
colonization through settlement, in the extractive instance, a pre-existent state plays a crucial role
in the process and aims to establish institutions to maximize extraction through the use of
violence and not institutions and a state that enable settlement. In these cases, the state does not
come into existence through a process of unanimity or consent; but instead states rise through
conquest, plunder, and imposition on certain individuals.
Buchanan addresses conquest and slavery and gives a simplified model, where
individuals are better off accepting the terms of the imposed state, over death (59). Although, his
concern involved the emergence of the state through the social contract and not through violence,
by ignoring the emergence of the state through violence his contractarian model is inapplicable
to the study of colonial and post-colonial political economies, in extractive colonial instances,
where there is no unanimity rule in the establishment of the state. Now that the dynamic within
these economies is one of constant conflict and struggle in attempt to break from these
“contracts”, where any form of drawing consent is from an initial and continued use of force
from the beginning of the interaction between state and conquered/enslaved.
In addition to this, within societies there are individuals that do not benefit from the
existence of the state as whole, a feature of both colonial and post-colonial political economies.
The Maya, being an example of individuals not benefitting from the establishment of the state
during the colonization period or post-independence. Networks of Maya communities, both
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outlived and existed as separate entities from large Ancient Maya city states; where prior to the
Conquista, norms, geography, trade and specialization were sufficient to maintain orderly
anarchy, in place of the state, within these communities in the region (Scarborough and Valdez
Jr. 2009). However, with the arrival of the Spaniards and post-independence, at no point did they
benefit from the introduction of a state, but instead continually oppressed and even now fighting
for land and resource rights by this institution (Anaya 1998).
LEGITIMACY BEFORE REVENUE
Margaret Levi (1989) modifies North’s model, recognizing that there are individuals that
at no point benefit from the existence of the state and due to this, the state in of itself is not a
beneficial entity with predatory features, but solely predatory in nature. By recognizing that the
state is predatory, Levi’s model does not conflict with historical cases of extractive colonialism.
Furthermore, Levi is in agreeance with North, that the maximization of state revenue is the
primordial end of all state action and policy.
A state’s monopoly on the use of force, causes it to act in non-competitive matters
(Colombatto 1998, 134). Hence, North’s claim that the state acts as a discriminatory monopolist
in the distribution and recognition of property and property rights. Although, the state holds a
monopoly of force and its primordial end is the maximization of revenue, it is constrained in an
equilibrium between rent extraction and public good delivery. This equilibrium between public
good delivery and rent extraction varies on the type of state (Furubotn and Richter 1997, 473474). Where redistributive democratic states are less extractive than autocracies (Boix 2003); and
constitutional republics/non-redistributive democracies the least extractive in comparison with
autocracies and redistributive democracies (McGuire and Olson 1996).
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Although Levi’s modifications of North create a model of the state that is applicable to
cases of extractive colonialism, it does not present sufficient insight into the process as to which
the state is able to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Additionally, if the state is
predatory in nature and its end is to maximize revenue, for both cases involving rent extraction
and the redistribution of rent extracted in public good delivery, it must first hold the means
necessary to plunder its people. Ultimately, what these analyses fail to address is the role force
and power play as a means to the ends of maximizing revenue, rent extraction, and public good
delivery.
Max Weber (1999) identifies that “(the) state is a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (78). Due to
this, any analysis of the state, even if economic, must include a conception of power, and the
process of establishing legitimacy, in order for it to act as a discriminatory monopolist in the
distribution of property rights, and finally accumulate sufficient power to increase its ability to
plunder. Due to these limitations, it is necessary to return to the thought experiment of Friday
and Crusoe and include a conception of power within it, by doing so be able to properly explain
the interaction between state legitimacy, economic development, and ultimately political
development.
POWER
Power is the ability an individual has to control their environment to satisfy their wants
(Rothbard 2009, 1330). The cases where Crusoe and Friday utilized their resources in order to
increase their capacity to fish or pick fruit, demonstrate an individual’s power over nature and
visible in an increase in welfare. However, if Crusoe were to hold Friday at spear point and steal
the fruit or fruit picker, this case demonstrates power over the individual and one benefiting at
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the expense of the other. When using the term power in the development of this theory it does
not focus on an individual’s power over nature, but instead their power over another individual.
Ultimately compatible with Robert Dahl’s (1957) conception of power “A has power over B to
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (202-203).
In the use of the thought experiment of Crusoe and Friday it is possible to develop two
possibilities of the emergence of the state and the process of legitimacy, one representing the
case of extractive colonialization and the other of colonization through settlement. Although
states emerge through forms other than colonization, the representation of power within either
case is applicable to any case and demonstrates the inevitable predatory nature of the state.
In the first scenario, extractive colonization, Crusoe holds Friday at spear point and
requests both the fruit and the fruit picker. Friday resists Crusoe, however by using the spear
Crusoe is able to steal a fourth of Friday’s fruit. Due to Friday’s resistance, Crusoe’s fatigue only
allows the stealing of a fourth of the fruit, now that with any amount greater than that Friday is
able to swat away the spear with the fruit picker. However, Friday is not strong enough to
recover the stolen fruit. This same interaction repeats itself, nonetheless Crusoe understands that
Friday is able to fend for themselves and Friday acknowledges the risk of a stabbing by Crusoe.
From this point, Friday agrees to give Crusoe a certain amount of fruit, with the understanding
that Crusoe will not continue using the spear in effort to steal from Friday; the amount of fruit
must be less than the amount lost in predation, but its worth greater to Crusoe than the cost of
exertion to acquire more than that amount of fruit. (Brute force or being conniving are also
applicable to the thought experiment. In the case of brute force, one might be stronger than the
other, but not strong enough to steal everything or smarter than the other, but not smart enough
to steal everything. Either of the three cases demonstrate power of one individual over the other).
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In this particular case, Crusoe is the equivalent of the state and although establishing
hegemony over Friday, Crusoe’s predation is limited to the extent Friday will not fight back. In
short, the extent to which the state is willing to acknowledge property rights is limited to an
individual’s ability to “fight” back and any form of payment does not represent consent from the
individual, but instead the payment serves as protection from the state itself, similar to a payment
towards a racketeering firm (Levi 1989, 11).
On the other hand, the second scenario representing settlement colonialism, introduces a
third individual, “Mr. Gunning’s Giant”. In this scenario, Friday wishes nothing more than to be
free to pick fruit without Crusoe stealing it and due to this hires Mr. Gunning’s Giant, who is
stronger than both of them individually and whose cost of hiring is lower than the cost of paying
Crusoe to stop stealing. Although, one party consents to Mr. Gunning’s Giant, the other does
not; demonstrating, Levi’s observation of individuals excluded from the contracting process
(1989). The relationship between Mr. Gunning’s Giant and Crusoe becomes the relationship
found in the previous scenario between Crusoe and Friday. Additionally, due to differences in
strength and power between Mr. Gunning’s Giant and Friday, at any point Mr. Gunning’s Giant
can decide that the amount of fruit is insufficient and although Crusoe may no longer partake in
predatory behavior against Friday, Mr. Gunning’s Giant is free to do so and to a greater extent
than Crusoe1.

1

This theory does not build on Buchanan’s introduction of a third party arbitrator, due to the fact that it seems
logically inconsistent with his claim that individuals are inherently unequal and there is a version of the state that
comes to existence through unanimity. If individuals are unequal than in the use of the Crusoe/Friday thought
experiment, one must be stronger than the other, holding a comparative advantage in the use of force. For Crusoe the
introduction of an arbitrator require that the costs of plunder, subtracting its benefits, be higher than the losses of
introducing a third party arbitrator. While for Friday, involve that losses to plunder be more than losses to include an
arbitrator. However, if the costs of plunder are significantly high for Crusoe, than it is more beneficial to partake in
non-predatory behavior (trade); in addition to this, it seems irrational that Friday benefit from any use of force or
power given that between the two Friday is the weaker individual. As stated by Buchanan “A contract of slavery
would, as other contracts, define individual rights, and, to the extent that this assignment is mutually accepted,
mutual gains may be secured from the consequent reduction in defense and predation effort” (59). This view seems
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Ultimately, what both scenarios present are the inevitability of a predatory state.
However, the state’s level of predation is dependent on the extent an individual is able to defend
themselves against predation. The ability an individual has to defend themselves, defines the
extent as to which an individual is free to do with both themselves and their property amidst the
existence of the state. This observation is consistent with North’s claim that the state acts as a
discriminatory monopolist in the distribution of property rights, however what this theoretical
insight demonstrates is that the state acts as a discriminatory monopolist, due to the limitations of
its predation regarding each individual within a society during the process of establishing
hegemony and legitimacy.
POWER AND DEVELOPMENT
The introduction of power, alongside the understanding of the necessity of property rights
for economic growth and development, then creates a better understanding of intra-societal
economic growth and economic development. The more particular individuals are able to fight
against or avoid predation by the state, the more likely these individuals are able to save and
invest and see increases in welfare and changes in social mobility. At no point does this imply
that the state’s existence is beneficial, but the introduction of its predation and power through de
jure laws creates a drawing out of a particular society’s property rights and, although limited,
able to guide investment activity.
An additional implication, is the understanding that the political means of accumulating
wealth does not come to existence through the creation of wealth, but instead the seizure of
wealth (Oppenheimer 1922, 24-25). Due to this, a state’s ability to accumulate wealth is limited
to the extent individuals victims of its predation are able to create wealth through the market

more compatible as a whole with the assumption of inequality among individuals and similar to the view adopted by
this theory, with the exception that it does not accept the existence of “mutual gains”.
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system, in other words the more individual wealth there is the more the state is able to take from
the victims of its predation. This limitation is able to explain the effect economic development
has on the rise of democratic institutions and values, or political development. Now that with
democratic institutions “ordinary citizens have a meaningful, even if indirect, role in the affairs
of the State, including the formulation of policies and laws and their implementation” (Shihata
1997, 635).
Visible in the thought experiment of two individuals, Crusoe and Friday, if Friday is able
to save, invest, and see increases in welfare, Friday is now capable of investing in means
necessary to “fight” predation or capable of “purchasing” additional property rights. Both
scenarios create a redrawing of an individual’s property rights, the potential for an increase in
wealth, creating a continuous renegotiation of rights and the eventual introduction of values,
such as freedom of speech and religion. These democratic values involving freedom from state
coercion, ultimately involve the extent of an individual’s self-ownership and are not a product of
a state’s benevolence, but instead of this process of renegotiation. As stated by Mises,
Freedom, as people enjoyed it in the democratic countries of Western civilization in the
years of the old liberalism’s triumph, was not a product of constitutions, bills of rights,
laws and statutes, those documents aimed only at safeguarding liberty and freedom,
firmly established by the operation of the market economy, against encroachments on the
part of the officeholders. No government and no civil law can guarantee and bring about
freedom otherwise than by supporting and defending the fundamental institutions of the
market economy. Government means always coercion and compulsion and is by
necessity the opposite of liberty. Government is a guarantor of liberty and is compatible
with liberty only if its range is adequately restricted to the preservation of economic
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freedom. Where there is no market economy, the best-intentioned provisions of
constitutions and laws remain a dead letter (283).
Ultimately, political development, defined as the rise of democratic institutions and
values, is a byproduct of the effects of economic development. Now that before the rise of
democratic institutions and values, an individual must first acquire the means necessary to fight
predation or “repurchase” property rights and renegotiate the extent of their self-ownership,
through an accumulation of wealth 2.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an economic theory of political development,
understanding that freedoms that characterize democratic institutions and values are ultimately a
byproduct of economic development. By laying out the basic conditions of economic growth and
development, the understanding that interpersonal exchange involves an acknowledgement of
self-ownership, and the inadequacy of contractarian theories of the state in economics to grasp
the predatory and negative effects of government, it created the possibility to demonstrate the
importance of state power over the individual, and property rights to explain the process of
political development.
By abandoning the idea of the state as beneficial entity and introducing its predatory
dynamics, this theory was able to demonstrate how the state uses power as a means to establish
legitimacy, but limited to the extent an individual is able to challenge its predation. The
limitation on predation, creates the establishment of de jure laws surrounding property rights and
allow an individual to save, invest, and increase personal welfare. This increase in welfare allows

2

Both Mises’s observation and theoretical insight developed here are consistent with the Hayek-Friedman
hypothesis that “economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom” (Lawson and Clark 2010, 231).
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the individual to either invest in means to challenge predation or “purchase” additional property
rights, with either scenario leading to a redrawing of property rights.
Finally, increases in property rights, lead to an increase in welfare, creating the means to
challenge or repurchase property rights, and the continuous repetition of this cycle. This
continuous cycle eventually leads to the rise of political freedoms, such as free speech and
freedom of religion, which are ultimately an acknowledgement of property rights and
demonstrate the effects of economic development on political development. Chapter 3 will
demonstrate how a state’s limited ability to predate, forced it to adopt policies in which there was
a general acknowledgement of property rights, leading to a rise of a middle class, and the
eventual emergence of political freedoms. While Chapter 4 will demonstrate a case where there
is less of an acknowledgement of property rights within the region, but also the effect on political
development to the groups of individuals who do benefit from a greater acknowledgement of
their property rights.
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CHAPTER 3: COSTA RICA

ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS
Costa Rica’s colonial history is extremely unique in comparison to the rest of the
countries in the Viceroyalty of New Spain (this includes the countries of Nicaragua, Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras), ultimately playing a major role in this nation’s particular political
development. During the Conquista and initial days of colonization, the Costa Rican landscape
did not fit the particular ends of the Spanish Crown, like other countries, nations, and regions in
Latin America. Unlike colonization in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia whose
colonization is one characterized by the end of settlement, colonization by the Spanish was one
with the end of extraction. Due to this, the political economy of the Crown was one in which the
main purpose of policy was to maximize rent extraction. The antecedent conditions of Costa
Rica play a significant role in its political development. The country lacked an indigenous
population to enslave and exploit, a land inadequate for agriculture, and a lack of precious metals
to extract (Facio 1972, 27-35). Due to these three factors, the special interest groups that arise
during the colonial period, were not large estate owners and individuals with limited access to
owning property, ultimately having a significant effect on Costa Rican politics, following the
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America.
As noted by Baloyra-Herp, there are individuals who make the case that the lack of an
indigenous population led to a homogenous population and positively impacted the political
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development and modernization of the country (2009, 298). Putting aside the racial and racist
component of this argument, there is some truth to it; the lack of a large indigenous population
did have an effect on the country’s political development. Policies involving the use of coerced
native labor such as those involving encomiendas and repartimientos were not possible in a
geographical landscape that lacked a large indigenous population. This not only had an effect on
the lack of large landholding individuals in Costa Rica, but also the lack of a Catholic Church
presence which was stronger in countries in Central America with larger indigenous populations,
such as Guatemala.
In addition to this, the inadequacy of land for commercial agriculture, isolated Costa Rica
from the possibility of trade. Until the 18th century the large portion of Costa Rican agriculture
mainly consistent of wheat, corn, and legumes, and even though there was a push to grow
tobacco in the region it ultimately failed (Facio 1972). Due to this, not only did Costa Rica lack a
population to exploit for commercial agriculture, but its land made it difficult to create an
agricultural economy other than that of subsistence agriculture.
Finally, the lack of precious metals, such as gold and silver, played a similar role as that
of the lack of an indigenous population and that is the fact that this did not allow for the
establishment of mining special interests. An aspect many political and economic historians
ignore from the Costa Rican colonial political economy is the effect the lack of trade had on
money in the region. Due to the lack of trade, the introduction of silver and gold in the region
was sparse, and even into its time of independence Costa Rica lacked a banking system, and
Cacao served as currency until the mid-19th century (León Sáenz 2014, 197-198). This is an
important aspect that often overlooked, now that how government interacts with coinage, either
through taxation or regulation on banking, ultimately has an effect on economic development.
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However, prior to regulating any banking system there must first be a system to regulate and
second, be able to hold sufficient power to enforce these banking regulations.
The lack of an indigenous population to exploit, land inadequate for agriculture, and the
absence of precious metals, are ultimately a reason as to why the special interests of Costa Rica
were much different than those found in both Guatemala and El Salvador. The special interests in
those countries were conservative interests that benefitted from the existence and structure of the
Spanish colony, such as large landholders and the church, the legacy of these large landholding
elite ultimately affected the violent political development of these countries. On the other hand,
the Costa Rican elite were a merchant class, dependent on the work by poorer classes. Due to
this, the merchant class was not necessarily interested in the ability to own large plots of land,
but instead a class whose wealth depended on the ability to trade in both domestic and foreign
markets, but limited by constraints on local production.
This is visible in the development of the Costa Rican coffee economy; with coffee as
inexistent in Costa Rica until 1804 and its export did not begin until 1832 and slowly increasing
until its boom in 1837 (Facio 1972, 39-40). In addition to this, during this time cities such as San
José started encouraging the homesteading of terrenos baldíos, this led to a rise in small
landholders, however since the merchant classes were not concerned with the ownership of land,
but instead the export of products, this allowed for the development of the Costa Rican coffee
economy.
CRITICAL JUNCTURE
In agreement with Mahoney, a critical juncture occurred during the period of liberal
reform, which he defines as a period between 1821-1914, however the defining period of time
does not range from 1821-1914, now that this period of time engulfs a too large of a span in
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Costa Rica history, but instead from 1838-1871. Now that, it is important to note that during the
span of time between 1821-1838 Costa Rica was a part of the Federal Republic of Central
America and not an independent nation, prior to 1838 there were policies aiming to liberalize the
Costa Rican economy, however these efforts were more local and occurring in cities, such as San
Jose, and not state-wide initiatives to centralize power.
Regarding the period of time after 1871, is a process of state centralization, however not
possible and constrained by the emergence of special interest groups and institutions prior to this
period, in particular a small landholding class/middle class and a merchant class that existed
prior to 1838, but largely depended on the coffee economy until afterwards. Mahoney identifies
two highly influential presidencies, during the period of liberal reform, the presidency of Braulio
Carrillo Colina (1838-1842) and Tomás Guardia Guitiérrez (1870-1882). The Guardia
presidency and the time after that is one consisting of increased governmental spending, centered
around the Coffee economy that developed within the country, however, this increase in
government spending would not be possible without the policies enacted prior to the Guardia
presidency, due to this the critical juncture in Costa Rican policies did not happen during the
entire liberal reform period, but instead during the period of time between 1838-1871, and the
remaining time of the liberal reform period (1871-1914) consisting of reactive sequences to the
critical juncture in 1838-1871.
The first Costa Rican presidency following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of
Central America, was that of Braulio Carrillo. The Carrillo presidency was extremely limited in
resources and due to this, found itself adopting nation-wide efforts, although regional, centered
on the exportation of coffee. His presidency was authoritarian, but the limitations placed on his
ability to centralize power were dependent on the coffee exporting class and visible in policies
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regarding the protection of private property; this is visible in his enactment of the Ley de Bases y
Garantías (Law of Foundations and Guarantees), as well as initial efforts in the creation of a
military or police force in the region.
The Ley de Bases y Garantías is the first major political document by Carrillo and any
government post-dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America, in effort to centralize
state power. This is visible in Article 4 of the political document, in which power is taken away
from the municipalities in the region, and redistributed to “el primer Jefe (head of state), una
Cámara Consultiva (advisory board), y otra Judicial (and a judicial board) (1841)”; the head of
state was the president and in this case Carrillo and both the advisory board and judicial board
were appointed by him. This led to the separation of the country by department and the citizenry
would elect leaders to represent them, ultimately making up the advisory board that interacted
with the head of state (CIJUL en Línea 2009, 7-8). In addition to this and of crucial importance is
the definition of a citizen according to the document, ultimately limiting political participation
and state protection to individuals whom were of 21 years of age, 20 if academics or had
children, as long as they owned property with the ability to provide sustenance to their family
members3.
Son Ciudadanos Costarricenses, todos los naturales del Estado, ó naturalizados en él que
tengan veintiún años cumplidos, ó veinte si fuesen profesores de alguna ciencia, ó padres
de familia; con tal que posean, a mas de casa propia, alguna propiedad, capital
ó industria, con cuyas ganancias ó frutos puedan en proporción a su estado, sostenerse
con sus familias. Solamente los Ciudadanos en ejercicio de este derecho, gozarán de voto

3

In addition to this, citizenship could be lost if an individual did not pay their taxes leading to the loss of any
“rights” granted by the Ley de Bases y Garantías.
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activo y pasivo en las elecciones, y pueden obtener destinos públicos de nombramiento
del Gobierno. (1841)
In addition to establishing the Ley de Bases y Garantías, which served as an initial effort
to centralize power, Carrillo took initial efforts to establish a military/policing force across the
nation. This military would eventually be vulnerable to the whims of elites within the country,
however since the elite were mainly a merchant class any conflict would not happen at the
producer level, with small landholders, but instead at the level involving exports and imports. In
addition to this, there was not a separate military class and bourgeoise, but instead the Costa
Rican elite integrated the military, ultimately creating an institution in which military action was
constrained to where it did not interrupt economic activity and stability, due to vested interests;
but existing interests limited the furthering of power centralization requiring a stable monopoly
of force.
Due to the elite integrating the military, following the coup d’état of Braulio Carrillo by
Honduran military general Francisco Morazan in 1842, Costa Rica faced a period of large-scale
political instability. At the same time the initial steps of state centralization of the Carrillo
presidency, and the lack of a strong conservative presence in Costa Rica, allowed for a
continuous process of liberalization; one where the coffee economy was not put at risk, but
instead “a political tool for particular factions within the dominant class” (Mahoney 2001, 149).
This continuous political instability continued until 1871, under the presidency of Tomas
Guardía and the establishment of a constitution that for the most part remained intact until 1949.
For the first time in Costa Rican political history are there guarantees involving freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, and freedom from government violation of privacy; central to the
constitution was also the defense and respect of private property (CIJUL en Línea 2009, 10-11).
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Finally, the effects of liberalization are visible in the economic effects that occurred in
Costa Rica during this time, in which there was an emergence of a middle-class product of the
small landholders and a state encouraging a homesteading approach to the ownership of
property. Precious metals, such as gold and silver, slowly started to emerge within the economy
as a product of the coffee economy and the rise of exports. During this time (1838-1871) the
state attempted to monopolize the coinage of gold and silver, but failed in the process; with
foreign currency dominating the Costa Rican economy (León Sáenz 2014, 197-198). Regardless
of failed efforts of the Costa Rican government to establish power over local currency, private
banks emerged and with them the issuing of paper currency.
Ultimately, what this span of time demonstrates is a process of liberalization, ensuring
the survival of interests involved with the coffee economy that was slowly emerging in Costa
Rica. At the beginning of this period of time the means available to the state were limited, and it
is possible to make the argument that the lack of a strong existing power structure allowed for
the emergence of a middle class product of the emerging coffee economy and a state with a
vested interest in its success.
REACTIVE SEQUENCES AND LEGACY
A state with a vested interest in its coffee economy is visible in periods of time following
1871 and although the state slowly incremented its functions, its predation was ultimately
constrained, now that its main source of income depended on the monoculture political economy
of the country. Ultimately, this led to the rise of a strong middle class with a vested interest in
being included in the political process (Mahoney 2001).
This is not to say that the period of time after 1871, was one of political stability, visible
in the large mobilizations against Bernardo Soto (1885-1889), coup d’état of Alfredo Gonzales
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Flores in 1917 and the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, however these events of political instability
are largely due to the vested interests existing within the country at the time. The large
mobilization of Bernardo Soto was mainly due to opposition created by wealthy classes of
individuals who were unable to influence policy to the extent they had prior to this (González
Villalobos and Avila 1983, Mahoney 2001). The policies of Alfredo Gonzalez Flores were
ultimately aimed at the country’s wealthy and the coffee export class, putting at risk the special
interests of the dominant class within the country, but it makes the strong case of the limitations
of state power and its constraints. Finally, the Civil War in 1948 is primarily due to the use of
military force by Teodoro Picado administration and ultimately the strike of fallen arms or
Huelga de Brazos Caidos in which local merchants halted the Costa Rican economy, these events
eventually led to the Civil War which lasted for 44 days, but resulted in the abolishment of the
Costa Rican military, the creation of the supreme electoral tribunal and the beginning of a
democracy that continues to go uninterrupted and the eventual development of the strongest
economy in Central America.
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CHAPTER 4: HONDURAS

ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS
Honduran colonial history begins with the discovery of the island of Guanaja by
Christopher Columbus on his fourth voyage to the Americas (Cohen 1969). During the initial
period of Spanish rule under colonial Honduras, the economy largely centered around the mining
industry and the extraction of gold and silver from the region. The impact of this initial discovery
was so substantial that at one point, Gracias, a city in occidental Honduras, was the capital of the
Captaincy General of Guatemala from 1540-1543. However, the boom of the Honduran mining
industry and its decline and fall, both occurred during the 16 th century with Honduran history.
Ultimately, during the colonial period Honduras faced little to no economic development similar
to that of Costa Rica and the emergence of any elite were regionally dispersed in the countries
major cities and the vast differences in geographical features within Honduras also created very
little intra-elite conflict within the nation. As noted by Mahoney, if one were to look at Honduran
political development and its colonial history, it is very possible to make the argument that its
political development should have been similar to that of Costa Rica (2001).
After independence from the Spaniards in 1821 and prior to the dissolution of the Federal
Republic of Central America, Hondurans such as José Cecilio del Valle and particularly
Francisco Morazan were highly influential within the political development of the Federal
Republic of Central America. Morazan was a radical, more than many liberals at the time, and
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often came into conflict with conservative special interests established in Central America.
While José Cecilio del Valle was a moderate found in an in between the paternalism of
conservatives and radicalism of liberals within this span of time. However, even though both of
these individuals were highly influential within the politics of the Federal Republic of Central
America, their battles and political interests did not tend to represent the reality of conservative
and liberal conflict in Honduras.
With the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America, Honduras did not have
the conservative special interests found in El Salvador and Guatemala, but a country
decentralized to the extent that political stability of a regime within Honduras, largely depended
on conservative or liberal support in Guatemala or El Salvador. From the dissolution of the
Federal Republic of Central America in 1838, until the presidency of Marco Aurelio Soto in
1876 there were no major impulses and efforts to centralize state power in the country, during
this span of time. Even though the Carrillo presidency managed to set rudimentary foundations
to influence political development in Costa Rica during the time between 1838-1842, this did not
occur in Honduras; however, what did occur that was similar to Costa Rica during the thirty year
span of time following the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America was the lack
of political stability due to intra-elite conflict and a span of time where presidencies lasted no
more than 2 to 3 years at a time. Regardless, of the lack of political stability and due to the
geographical and regional interests within the country, although small in comparison with other
economies in Central America, a small economy centered on the exportation of leather began to
develop in the country.
Finally, in 1876, Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-1883) took first steps to centralize power within
Honduras, and the beginning of the liberal reform period within Honduras. For the most part the
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leather industry took hold of the nation’s economy, but in addition to this industries such as
alcohol and tobacco were developing in the area and due to this Soto found himself in a state
where to enact public policies it was required to raise taxes within these industries, however not
raise them to the extent that it would negatively affect investment within the country (Mahoney
2001, 167-169).
Since the coffee economy was emerging in Central America, there was a positive effort to
develop a coffee economy within Honduras with the push of an agrarian reform, revolving
around a model similar to that of Costa Rica consisting of small and family landholders.
However, regardless of efforts to push for the development of the Honduran economy to one of
coffee exportation, the geographical layout did not allow the development of a strong coffee
economy.
Unlike the Costa Rican government in which tax revenue increased with the growth of
the coffee economy, state reform and the funds needed from this relied on already established
industries, to push a positive effort during the Soto presidency and after the end of his tenure in
1883, which was ultimately not suitable for its environment. However, simultaneously two
developments in the late 19th century were crucial and necessary for the rise of Tiburcio Carías in
the first half of the 20th century. The first, was the rise of the banana economy, which at first
were owned by small local landholders, but generated interest by foreign investors ultimately
leading to the presence of US capitalists within Honduras (171-175). The conservatization of
liberalism and the liberalization of conservatism in Central America, that led to liberal policy
centered around maintaining power and not democratization and liberalization, which at least on
paper were the ends of Central American liberals prior to independence (Becerra 2007, 12,
Woodward 1984). The conservatization aspect, ultimately aims to keep certain socioeconomic
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structures in place, while the liberalization was mainly due to the fact that conservatives
understood the necessity of adopting liberal policies in order to increase wealth accumulation.
The effects of the emergence of the foreign dominated banana industry and
conservatization of liberalism and liberalization of conservatives are visible in occurrences
during the early 20th century. The first being the relationship between deposed president Manuel
Bonilla and Sam “Banana Sam” Zemurray would devise a plan that would lead to the
reinstatement of Manuel Bonilla as president, with a militia funded by Zemurray (d'Ans 2009,
191-192); in which Bonilla would take control of the Bay Islands and Honduran coasts in 1911
and with help of local militia reinstate himself in office on 1912. Ultimately, leading to the
concession of 10,000 acres for the production of banana to Zemurray along the Honduran
Guatemala border and solidifying the relationship between Honduran political leaders and United
States/foreign capitalists. This enabled an understanding among the political class that a crony
relationship with the United States, served as a means, necessary for political action, that would
not be possible through the output created by domestic producers.
Similar to Costa Rica there was a lack of a strong conservative presence within Honduras.
However, the conservatization of liberalism and liberalization of liberalism influenced the
Honduran Partido Liberal with a conservative and radical group of liberals, ultimately leading to
constant conflict within the party and the inability to back only one political leader. From this
conservative group the Partido Nacional emerges and solidifying itself within Honduran politics
with the Tiburcio Carías dictatorship.
CRITICAL JUNCTURE
The Partido Nacional emerged out of a group of conservative members of the Partido
Liberal in 1916 and quickly integrated itself within the Honduran political party system. Their
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presence was significant to the extent that prior to the elections of 1932 that placed Carías into
power, he had run twice and was able to become president of the national congress from 1924 to
1931.
Prior to the elections of 1932 and during his time as president of congress, Carías was able to
gain loyalists across the country and strengthen the party in the process, and due to this the
Carías was supported by a unified Partido Nacional and able to win the presidency while running
against three other candidates from the Partido Liberal. The Honduras Carías interacted with
during the initial years of his administration (1933-1949) was largely decentralized and the
economic development within the country was for the most part centralized around the foreign
owned banana companies.
However, during his presidency Carías managed to centralize power, primarily due to the
fact of the existence of United States special interests. Unlike other presidencies in Latin
America and Central America, Carías faced no threat to the interests of both American capitalists
and diplomats, to the extent that diplomats largely believed that the Carías administration as
easily manipulable (Dodd 2005, 47), but when looking into the political action of Carías he
managed to use United States presence in his favor.
In return for land grants and concessions the United Fruit Company would give Carías
the financial resources to both pay off and reward his loyalists and in the process allow Carías to
both centralize power by placing supporters and loyalists at every level of Honduran
government. In addition to this, the funds from American capitalists allowed him to invest in
nonexistent infrastructure and in the process expand his power by placing supporters in charge of
these industries, the telegraph one of many industries (58). Unlike Soto in the 19 th century who
largely relied on taxing slowly developing industries, in order to expand government power,
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Carías’s expansion of government largely relied on foreign capitalists, in a largely successful
industry at the time. Not only did the Carías administration centralize power, largely surrounding
the ends of the administration, but Carías also managed to stifle efforts of unionization by
individuals working in the banana industry with the potential to risk both the profitability and
stability of foreign owned banana industries.
Another aspect that is crucial during the Carías presidency is his success in managing to
set the foundations necessary for a centralized national military, something only possible through
United States military aid. Carías ran a successful support campaign in depicting Honduras as a
pro-America country and his presidency as a pro-America administration. Prior to Carías, the
Honduran military largely consisted of decentralized militias, serving as political instruments, in
which their presence was strong during election season, but not actively present during any other
span of time and due to this there was no strong military force in the county (Ropp 1974, 505506). However, with United States foreign aid the Carías administration managed to found the
Escuela de Aviacion Militar in 1934, establishing the Honduran air force, through which the
United States maintained control over aerial training until 1947 and the establishment of the
basic arms force (army) in 1946 (509-510). The whole span of the Carías presidency was one in
which not only did Carías manage to invest and expand government infrastructure, but also
establish a Honduran military in the region, ultimately centralizing a decentralized nation in the
process.
REACTIVE SEQUENCES AND LEGACY
The Carias dictatorship ended in 1949, however it established the institutions that
dominated 20th century Honduran politics: a ruling class dependent on the United States
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government and foreign capitalists and the establishment of the military as a strong interest
group within Honduran politics.
Unlike the rest of Central America (with the exception of Costa Rica) victims of civil
wars in the mid and late 20th century, Honduras became ridden of a string of coup d’états until
the temporary, but longest running establishment of democracy in 1982. Following the Carías
administration there were coup d’états in 1956, 1971, 1972, and 1978. It is unfortunate, that
Mahoney is unable to recognize the importance of the Carías dictatorship, now that without his
presidency the special interest of the military would have not arisen and although responsible for
a lack of political instability, policies during the late 20th century centered on strengthening and
not challenging the military’s position within Honduran politics.
In addition to this, the distinction between the Partido Nacional and the Partido Liberal
were minimal, now that administrations from either party were dependent on the support of
foreign capitalist and United States government interests. In no other point in time is this visible,
than during the Carter and Reagan administrations in the United States, where United States and
Honduran relations focused on advancing American interests in the rest of Central and Latin
America, and as stated by Philip Shepherd back in 1984, “Honduras is doing Reagan’s dirty
work in Central America” (109).
Since the existent institutions within Honduras did not revolve around a middleclass or
national interests, but instead on foreign interests, during the span of time after the Carias
dictatorship, political leaders held little to no incentive to liberalize Honduras and attempts to do
so, either politically or economically, led to the strong-arming or removal of individuals from
political office. This is visible in the failed land reforms of the 1970s within Honduras.
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Finally, the legacy of the Carias dictatorship is visible in the 21 st century, where after 28
years of uninterrupted democracy, Honduras suffered from a coup d’état once more. A coup
d’état led by Honduran political and economic elite in which the United States did not speak out
against and one in which the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Clinton, admitted to playing a
hand in the aftermath (Weisbrot 2014). Due to this, it is necessary to challenge Mahoney’s
assessment of the Carías and instead see this point of time as one of never seen before state
centralization in Honduras, with a legacy well into the 21 st century.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS

The purpose of the analysis is to place the path dependent explanation within the theory
developed. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the antecedent conditions are the pre-existent groups and
the means available to either predate or challenge predation. The critical juncture is a period in
which state actors, and individuals with the means to predate, aim to establish legitimacy within
a region, leading to a drawing of de jure property rights and the emergence of special interest
groups. The reactionary sequence (and part of the critical juncture) is a strengthening of
institutions in which state action revolves around and is constrained by these groups; in certain
cases, this leads to the eventual rise of political freedoms that characterize political development,
such as freedom of speech, the press, and of religion. Finally, the legacy is both the emergence
and longevity of these freedoms visible in democracy or the failure of them.
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS
In both Costa Rica and Honduras there were a lack of strong conservative interests, such
as the Catholic Church and individuals that benefitted from the colonial structure, and elites
regionally dispersed and either uninterested or lacking the means available to centralize power,
or the ability to expand within the respective countries. It is important to take this into account,
because in comparison with other Central American countries, such as El Salvador and
Guatemala, both the economic and political development of Costa Rica and Honduras were
significantly lacking. Due to this, after independence where elites, conservatives and liberals, in
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El Salvador and Guatemala were interested in maintaining power, any state action by both Costa
Rica and Honduras required an establishment of power.
In the case of Costa Rica, prior to the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central
America in 1838, the country did not have precious metals, a large indigenous population to
exploit, or the ability of large-scale agriculture. However, the exportation of tobacco and the
eventual emergence of coffee in the country, created a merchant class with special interests
vested in exporting. At the same time, since there were no slaves or sufficient military power to
create forced labor, regional governments found themselves incentivized to both encourage and
accept the homesteading of land, leading to the emergence of family/small landholding
peasantry.
On the other hand, prior to and after the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central
America, Honduras found themselves in a similar position. However, unlike Costa Rica in
different points in time, especially in the 16th century, Honduras established a strong mining
industry, eventually fading after its boom in the first half of the 16 th century. Following the
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Central America, Honduras did not have the coffee
economy of Costa Rica and until the introduction of foreign banana capitalists, Honduras’s
economy was diverse, but regionally dispersed throughout the country and not strong enough to
sustain a centralization of state power or the establishment of legitimacy. Ultimately, this created
a political class with little impact, but with the introduction of foreign interests, one with the
capability of expanding state power. The role Sam Zemurray played in placing Manuel Bonilla
in power in the early 20th century, in exchange for the concession of land on the
Honduras/Guatemala border established a political class, dependent on foreign special interests.
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CRITICAL JUNCTURE
The critical juncture among both of these countries is separated by a significant amount
of time, in Costa Rica from 1838-1871, while in Honduras from 1933-1949. Both of these
periods consisted of political actors with the purpose of establishing legitimacy and succeeding
in the process.
In Costa Rica the critical juncture begins with the presidency of Braulio Carrillo in 1838.
During this point of time both the export class and small landholding peasantry/class were
established within the socioeconomic structure of the country and due to this the Carrillo
administration found itself in a position in which the drawing of de jure property rights either
disrupted or built on the growing coffee economy in the country, in this case the Carrillo
administration decides to expand and encourage the homesteading of land, while simultaneously
aim to expand government functions in which revenue is dependent on the growth of the coffee
economy. Following his coup d’état to Francisco Morazán in 1942, there was a continuous
process of political instability, caused by intra-elite dispute, however with political leaders and
action constrained to the continuous success of the coffee economy. During the span of time
from 1838-1871, from the small landholding peasantry a middle class emerges. A unique feature
that may potentially aid the of Costa Rica by economic historians is that of the country’s banking
system, one which lacked Gold and Silver, but with the increase in exports the growth and
development can be traced by seeing the eventual introduction of gold and silver coins, as well
as the emergence of a private banking system.
The critical juncture in Honduras, did not happen until the Tiburcio Carías dictatorship in
1933, now that prior to this point any efforts of state centralization largely failed. Marco Aurelio
Soto aimed to adopt policies similar to Costa Rica at the time, encouraging homesteading and
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small landholding. However, these efforts largely failed, due to the fact that the government
pushed for the development of a coffee economy, not suitable for the geographical landscape of
the entire country. Dispute among liberals in the Partido Liberal, led to the rise of the Partido
Nacional in 1916, individuals whom made up a conservative group within the liberal party. The
Partido Nacional quickly solidified itself within the Honduran political landscape and in 1932
won the elections with Tiburcio Carías.
Making sure to become a candidate that appealed to United States government interests,
as well as the interests of the United Fruit Company, both assisted in Carías effort to centralize
power and ultimately establish legitimacy in Honduras. Through the continuous concessions
given to the United Fruit Company, as well as stifling unionization efforts, Carías received the
funds necessary to both expand government infrastructure and place and payoff loyalists at every
level of the Honduran governmental and socioeconomic level. Prior to this point there had not
been a level of widespread centralization as one under his dictatorship. In addition to this prior to
this period of time the Honduran military consisted of a dispersed militia, used as a political tool
among the elite. With help from the United States and through the use of United States military
aid Carías managed to establish a centralized military, and in the process further centralizing
power.

REACTIVE SEQUENCES AND LEGACY
What the critical juncture in both of these countries demonstrate are the emergence of
special interests highly influential within the socioeconomic and political structures of each
country, ultimately influencing the political development of the two, in Costa Rica the period of
1838-1871 solidified the small landholding middle class, eventually demanding political
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participation and in Honduras 1924-1949, creating a political class dependent on United States
state and non-state financing, and a military class, ultimately interrupting processes of
democratization throughout the 20th century and the inability to guarantee political freedom.
While ultimately, able to explain why two countries with similar conditions during their periods
of colonization and prior to independence developed drastically different.
In the case of Costa Rica, the coffee economy and the lack of a strong conservative
presence allowed for the introduction of homesteading policies and the emergence of a
landholding peasantry, which eventually became a strong middle class advocating for democratic
freedoms. In this case, the state did not hold sufficient means to predate against this people, but
forcing it to adopt policies which recognized the property rights of these group of people in order
to establish legitimacy. While government means of predation grew with the expansion of the
coffee economy, so did the impact of this group of individuals on the political structure and due
to this in order to maintain legitimacy the state not only depended on an elite class, but the
emerging middle class to exist. This is not to say that the government was for the people,
however largely constrained by these two classes and in no other instance is this as clear as the
Costa Rican coup d’état in 1917, where the coffee economy was put at risk by the policies of the
president Alfredo Gonzalez Flores.
Although Honduras lacked a strong conservative presence, the absence of the potential
for a coffee economy and the introduction of foreign capitalist interest are ultimately able to
explain the drastic differences in economic and political development between Costa Rica and
Honduras. In Honduras a middle class did not develop and due to this, not able to hold the state
accountable, but instead largely a victim of its predation. The de jure property rights drawn
during the Carías dictatorship revolved around United States and political class interests,
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however additionally establishing a military class that did not exist prior to this point. Due to
this, state action was not constrained in respecting and expanding the property rights of a middle
class, but instead of foreign interests, a political/bureaucratic class, and the military.
These two drastic differences properly explain legislation emerging in 1871 in the Costa
Rican constitution defending political freedoms, such as freedom of speech, the eventual
abolition of the military, and the establishment of a continuous democracy in 1949. While in
Honduras, this properly grasps the string of coup d’états in the second half of the 20 th century
and the lack of incentives by political actors to satisfy the interests of individuals outside of the
military, political class, and United States/foreign interests.
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CONCLUSION

Through the application of a theory guided application of a path dependent explanation,
this work aims to overcome the issue of the under-theorization of Honduran political
development, while contributing to the literature on Central American political economy by
including an analysis of Costa Rican political development. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main
goal of introducing and developing a property rights theory of political development is to create
a theory broad enough to grasp the concept of political development as a whole, in order to allow
middle level theorizing. The property rights approach is one that aims to be consistent with
property rights analyses, as well as Austrian or Mengerian approaches to issues pertaining to
political economy.
Although the analyses within this work aim to contribute to research on the political
economy of Central America, it is important to point out additional contributions of this work.
The first, is an attempt to consolidate the Austrian approach to economics and the (historical)
institutionalist approach to political science, ultimately allowing for the introduction of theory
guided applications of path dependence, based on the axiomatic principle that individuals act
purposively in attainment of their ends, amidst scarcity. The use of the economizing man allows
for the introduction of an economic approach to political science, without the need to ignore the
fact that the individual is a social being and the effect culture and norms play in molding society.
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The second contribution is the theory developed in Chapter 2, this theoretical contribution
provides a rudimentary framework as to which either economic historians or political scientists
can build on; either through the application of the theory to the study of other historical cases or
the potential to formalize the theory through the use of game theory. In addition to this, the
theory aims to point out the importance of property rights and the potential effect this has on
political development, this is ultimately visible in the historical cases of both Costa Rica and
Honduras.
Finally, the final three chapters show the coherence between the Austrian approach to
economics and historical institutionalism, the theory developed, and the application of path
dependence. Ultimately, achieving the goal of demonstrating the effect de jure laws surrounding
property rights during period of state centralization, lead to the rise of interest groups, whom
ultimately have an effect of the political development of a nation. This is visible in the middle
class that emerged from the Costa Rican coffee economy from 1838-1871, which eventually
created a middle class with a desire to participate in the political process, creating a sustainable
democracy. While in Honduras, during the Tiburcio Carias period as president of congress and
dictatorship, creating a political class dependent on foreign financial and military aid and a
military class that did not exist prior to this, ultimately creating an unstable process of political
development constrained by domestic political interests by the political and military class, as
well as United States governmental and non-governmental interests.
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